China’s growing diplomatic footprint in South Asia: e.g., hosting the first-ever trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Introduction

China’s foreign-policy expansion beyond its traditional East Asian sphere has in recent years taken on a marked emphasis on South Asia. For Beijing, South Asia is not simply “far away” – it is a region of rising strategic importance in the context of connectivity ambitions, maritime access, rivalry with India, and geoeconomic leverage. Over the last decade and especially more recently, China has deepened bilateral ties, increased infrastructure investment, bolstered defence cooperation, and begun experimenting with multilateral formats in the region. A recent milestone in this process is the first-ever trilateral diplomatic meeting hosted by China between Pakistan and Bangladesh (held in June 2025 in Kunming) — signalling a new chapter of China-led regional diplomacy in South Asia.

This essay explores how and why China is extending its diplomatic footprint in South Asia, examines the trilateral meeting in detail, analyzes its broader strategic implications, and outlines both the opportunities and risks for the involved states and for regional stability.

Background: China’s evolving strategy in South Asia

Historical context

China’s engagement in South Asia has long roots, but traditionally concentrated on its relationship with Pakistan, and more modestly with the other countries in the region. The Sino-Pakistani partnership, often characterised as an “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership”, has been a bedrock of China’s South Asia policy. Pakistan has served as a front-line partner for China’s strategic ambitions vis-à-vis India and has offered geographic access (for example, via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor , or CPEC) to the Arabian Sea.

For much of its bilateral relations with Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Bhutan, China’s role was largely economic/infrastructure rather than overtly diplomatic-military, and India remained the dominant regional power whose interests were treated cautiously by China. In recent years, however, that calculus is shifting.

Drivers of China’s deepening engagement

There are several interlocking drivers behind China’s growing diplomatic footprint in South Asia:

Connectivity and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
South Asia lies at the intersection of China’s ambitions for both its over-land “Silk Road Economic Belt” and maritime “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” China views South Asia as a strategic corridor for trade, energy, and infrastructure, that can link its western provinces (e.g., Xinjiang) to the Indian Ocean and beyond. For example, major projects in Pakistan (CPEC) and Bangladesh reflect this connectivity logic.
Strategic competition with India
China and India share a long, contested land border and a pattern of geostrategic rivalry. Within South Asia, China’s deepening ties with India’s neighbours is often seen as part of a “containment” or encirclement strategy—though China would not publicly frame it in that way. A Hudson Institute analysis noted:

“China has adopted strategies reminiscent of the ancient Indian strategist and philosopher Kautilya, encircling India with a network of friendly states reliant on Chinese support.”
This strategic dimension gives China an incentive to build diplomatic outreach in South Asia beyond purely economic interest.
Geoeconomic leverage and “debt diplomacy”
China uses large-scale infrastructure investments and loans in the region. While these generate economic opportunities for recipient states, they also create dependencies and diplomatic leverage for China. For example, numerous South Asian countries have borrowed heavily from China and carry significant Chinese-funded infrastructure.
Maritime access and Indian Ocean reach
China’s interest in the Indian Ocean (for energy routes, maritime trade, and naval operations) encourages it to build port infrastructure, connectivity hubs and alliances in South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral. South Asia is therefore pivotal to China’s “String of Pearls” narrative (though China may deny that phrase).
Diplomacy as complementar to economics
While infrastructure and trade dominate the headlines, diplomacy enables China to cement relationships, frame new regional architectures, convene states under its leadership, and thereby legitimise its role (rather than simply being a contractor or investor). The June 2025 trilateral meeting is a manifestation of this shift from bilateral economics to multilateral diplomacy.

Manifestations of China’s footprint in South Asia

China’s growing diplomatic footprint shows up in a number of distinct but overlapping spheres:

Economic and infrastructure engagement

In many South Asian countries, China is now the largest trading partner, a major source of foreign investment, and a key infrastructure financier. For example:

In Bangladesh: China is the largest trading partner with annual trade totals surpassing US$25 billion.
The infrastructure footprint in Bangladesh includes major power plants (e.g., Payra), the Karnaphuli river tunnel, rail expansion, industrial zones.
In Pakistan, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) remains China’s marquee connectivity project, linking China’s west to Pakistan’s port of Gwadar, with rail, road, energy, and port infrastructure.

These economic engagements give China tangible presence in South Asia and provide channels for diplomatic and strategic leverage.

Defence and strategic cooperation

China has ramped up its defence/material cooperation with South Asian states: delivering arms, military training, joint exercises, and helping develop military infrastructure. For example, Bangladesh has procured Chinese arms (e.g., frigates, tanks, submarines) and is reportedly interested in the co-produced Pakistan-China JF-17 fighter.

In Pakistan, the strategic partnership is deeper, going back decades, including nuclear cooperation, missile technology, and submarine platforms.

This defence dimension gives the bilateral ties greater strategic weight than mere economic infrastructure.

Diplomatic outreach and multilateral architecture

China’s engagement is not limited to bilateral relationships. It is increasingly playing the role of convener and agenda-setter in South Asia. The June 2025 meeting between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh is a prime example.

Moreover, China engages South Asian states in forums such as the China-South Asia Expo and China-South Asia Cooperation Forum (the Kunming meeting was held on the sidelines of such an expo) to institutionalise its role.

China also uses soft-power, educational exchanges, think-tanks, and party-to-party contacts to deepen ties with political elites in the region.

The Trilateral Meeting: China-Pakistan-Bangladesh

Let us examine the June 19, 2025 meeting in Kunming (Yunnan Province) in greater detail, as it encapsulates many of the themes above and signals a potential departure in regional dynamics.

On June 19, 2025, senior diplomats from China, Pakistan and Bangladesh met in Kunming during the 9th China-South Asia Expo and 6th China-South Asia Cooperation Forum.
The Chinese side was represented by Vice-Foreign Minister Sun Weidong; Bangladesh by Foreign Secretary Md. Ruhul Alam Siddique; Pakistan by Additional Secretary (Asia–Pacific) Imran Ahmed Siddiqui; Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch participated virtually.
The meeting was reported as the launch of a “trilateral cooperation mechanism” by China and Pakistan, while Bangladesh described it more cautiously as an “informal dialogue.”
The agenda included cooperation in trade, agriculture, climate adaptation, education, cultural exchanges and connectivity.
Analysts interpret the meeting as China knitting together a new diplomatic track in South Asia, possibly as a minilateral alternative to the moribund regional institutions like South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
Though the precise outcomes (e.g., signed agreements) remain limited in the public domain, the symbolism is important: China as convener, Bangladesh and Pakistan cooperating after years of limited interaction (since 1971, their relations were complicated), and a potential stepping-stone toward a broader bloc.

Thus, the meeting serves as both a diplomatic signal of China’s ambition and a functional initiative (though still early) to deepen multilateral cooperation under China’s auspices in South Asia.

Implications of China’s growing diplomatic footprint

The expanding role of China in South Asia—particularly as illustrated by the trilateral meeting—carries significant implications, which we can divide into implications for China, for the two partner countries (Pakistan/Bangladesh), and for regional geopolitics (especially India and other South Asian states).

Implications for China

Enhanced regional influence: By hosting trilateral (and potentially multilateral) formats, China positions itself not just as a bilateral actor but as a regional hub. This amplifies its prestige and influence in South Asia.
Strategic leverage vis-à-vis India: By deepening ties with India’s neighbours, China creates diplomatic pull and strategic options that may constrain India’s freedom of action. A minilateral mechanism that excludes India could further shift regional balance.
Securing connectivity and maritime access: Enhanced engagement with Pakistan and Bangladesh supports China’s connectivity ambitions—from CPEC to ports, railways, and sea links—thereby helping bypass chokepoints (e.g., the Malacca Strait) and diversify trade/energy routes.
Economic advantages: As infrastructure and trade deepen, Chinese firms gain contracts, Chinese technology spreads, and Chinese commerce obtains favourable terms. China’s role as largest trading partner to many South Asian countries reinforces its commercial penetration.
Institution-building and norm-setting: By being convenor and architect, China gets to shape the norms, rules, and agenda of regional cooperation initiatives—potentially assisted by states that may prefer China’s governance model.
Diplomatic buffering: By building ties with smaller states, China may gain diplomatic support in multilateral fora (e.g., UN, regional organisations) or reduce isolation in case of confrontation with major powers.

Implications for Pakistan and Bangladesh

Pakistan

Pakistan remains perhaps China’s closest partner in the region. The deepening ties (now with trilateral outreach via Bangladesh) reinforce Pakistan’s ability to hedge vis-à-vis India and diversify its partnerships beyond the West.
Economically, CPEC and related infrastructure projects continue to draw Chinese investment, but also raise concerns over debt sustainability and sovereignty. China’s diplomatic support is often framed as a strategic shield for Pakistan.
Regionally, Pakistan gains a platform to normalise relations with Bangladesh (which historically were tense), which may open new trade, transit, and connectivity routes. For instance, the trilateral talks signal thawing of Bangladesh-Pakistan ties.

Bangladesh

For Bangladesh, closer ties with China offer multiple benefits—large infrastructure investment, access to Chinese markets, defence cooperation, and diplomatic balancing between India and China. For example, Bangladesh reportedly received duty-free access to Chinese market till 2028, and Chinese commerce delegations are large.
The trilateral meeting offers Dhaka an opportunity to augment its external partnerships beyond India, potentially gaining bargaining power and diversification.
On the downside, Bangladesh must manage the risks of aligning too closely with China—namely, increasing dependence, potential diplomatic backlash from India, and the burden of Chinese loans/infrastructure.
The trilateral format also signals Bangladesh’s willingness to open new diplomatic pathways (with Pakistan), possibly reviving trade and connectivity that were dormant for decades. For instance, visa regimes and physical cargo route changes were already in motion.

Implications for Regional Geopolitics

India

India watches China’s expanding footprint in South Asia with concern. The emergence of China-led minilateral mechanisms (Pakistan-China-Bangladesh) in India’s immediate neighbourhood threatens to erode New Delhi’s traditional primacy in South Asia. Some analysts describe this as “ring-fencing India”.
India’s trade, diplomatic and strategic options may be impacted. If Bangladesh and Pakistan deepen connectivity ties (via China), India's ability to act as regional hub might diminish.
However, India still possesses advantages: size of its economy, civilisational/linguistic ties with neighbours, and a vast diaspora. The coming years will test how effectively India counters China’s overtures.

Other South Asian Countries

Other states like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives, Bhutan may also see China’s diplomatic footprint increasing. China may seek to replicate trilateral/mini-multilateral formats with them.
The region’s traditional architecture for regional cooperation—SAARC—has long been faltering because of India–Pakistan tensions. China’s new initiatives may fill the vacuum, but may also fragment the region into China-led minilaterals rather than inclusive regionalism.

Regional connectivity and trade

If China succeeds in knitting together Pakistan, Bangladesh (and perhaps other states) into a connectivity network (roads, rails, ports, digital), new trade corridors could emerge. For example, Bangladesh-Pakistan direct shipping is already reported to have restarted in 2025.
This could restructure regional commerce, bypassing India’s mainland in some routes, and creating alternate supply-chains oriented toward China.

Security dynamics

Increased Chinese defence cooperation with South Asian nations might shift security dynamics—naval access, arms flows, joint exercises. As Bangladesh began participating in Pakistani naval exercises, and interest in JF-17 fighters emerged, this becomes a regional security development.
For India, this raises the prospect of two of its neighbours aligning more closely with China–Pakistan axis rather than staying within India’s orbit.
For the United States and other external actors, China’s strengthened South Asia diplomacy means they may need to recalibrate their regional strategies—either competing or cooperating.

A Closer Look at Key Themes

Connectivity and transit corridors

China’s connectivity push is central to its diplomatic and strategic vision. In South Asia, this takes multiple forms:

In Pakistan, the CPEC corridor remains the most ambitious project: linking Gwadar port (on the Arabian Sea) with China’s Xinjiang region via roads, rail, pipelines. This gives China an alternate route to the Indian Ocean independent of the Malacca Strait vulnerability.
In Bangladesh, China is involved in port expansion (e.g., Mongla, Payra), deep-sea tunnels, railways and industrial zones. These enhance Bangladesh’s connectivity and offer China logistical footholds.
The trilateral meeting underscores the connectivity logic: trade, maritime routes, agriculture logistics were on the agenda. If Pakistan, Bangladesh and China coordinate transit corridors, it may reshape routes in South Asia (for instance, Bangladesh-Pakistan shipping, land routes via Pakistan, Chinese and Bangladeshi industrial zones).
The connectivity dimension also has an economic diplomacy side: China offers connectivity as inducement for political alignment, and the states receive infrastructure that may catalyse growth (though also comes with debt and dependency risks).

Economic dependency and debt dynamics

China’s infrastructure financing has created substantial economic ties—and obligations.

According to data: China’s trade with South Asia almost doubled in a decade, reaching nearly US$200 billion (aggregate) with annual growth of ~6.3%.
The loans and projects often raise concerns of “debt-trap diplomacy”. For example, Bangladesh has taken significant loans from China (AidData estimated $6.1 billion for BRI projects) and invited Chinese investment in key sectors.
The Hudson Institute analysis notes that many infrastructure projects in the region are economically unviable and risk pushing recipient states into unsustainable debt burdens.
From China’s perspective, this economic dependence generates diplomatic leverage. From the recipient state’s view, the challenge is to ensure projects genuinely deliver development rather than becoming a drain or source of sovereignty erosion.

Diplomacy and peer-to-peer networks

China’s diplomatic strategy is multidimensional:

Beyond state-to-state ties, China cultivates party-to-party links, think-tanks, academic networks and people-to-people exchanges across South Asia. This deepens normative influence and creates cross-cutting elite networks.
Hosting trilateral meetings and regional forums positions China as a hub of cooperation, enhancing its normative role (for example: “China-South Asia Cooperation Forum”, “Expo”). The Kunming trilateral shows China is comfortable convening multiple South Asian states under its leadership.
Diplomatically, China emphasises “equal and mutually trusted” relations, as reflected in the June meeting’s official language. This helps soften perceptions of Chinese dominance, even though the power imbalance remains.

Military and security dimension

The security implications are both overt and subtle.

China becomes a key arms-supplier and military partner to South Asian states. For example: 72 % of Bangladesh’s weapons between 2019-23 came from China.
Bangladesh’s participation in Pakistan’s naval exercise “Aman 2025” after more than a decade signals a changing security alignment.
For China, acquiring naval/military access (ports, logistics bases) in South Asia enhances its ability to project power in the Indian Ocean—and to secure sea-lines of communication and energy corridors.
For India, the strengthening of China-armed networks in its neighbourhood heightens strategic anxiety. It may prompt India to deepen its own alliances (e.g., with the U.S., Australia, Japan) or boost engagement with its neighbours.

Diplomatic realignment and new regional architecture

The trilateral meeting suggests that China is exploring a new regional architecture in South Asia—a minilateral structure anchored by China rather than the traditional India-dominated frameworks.

The traditional South Asian regional institution, SAARC, has struggled due to India-Pakistan tensions. Analysts note this vacuum and China’s attempt to fill it.
The June 2025 meeting between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh is seen as a possible prototype for a new “China-led South Asia Plus” architecture.
By gathering Pakistan and Bangladesh (two of India’s neighbours) under its leadership, China potentially reshapes the regional order—where New Delhi’s dominance is challenged and China's role is central.
For Bangladesh, this new alignment offers alternatives to India-centric regionalism; for Pakistan, it reinforces its strategic partnership with China; for China, it enhances its diplomatic leverage and regional presence.

The Trilateral Meeting in Focus: Why It Matters

Why is the June 2025 trilateral meeting between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh significant? Several reasons:

Symbolic breakthrough
- It is the first-ever high-level trilateral track between these three countries (China, Pakistan, Bangladesh) hosted by China. The official report states: “In a historic first … since 1971, the two states started direct trade” (referring to Pakistan and Bangladesh) and the meeting was held during the China-South Asia Expo.
- Bangladesh and Pakistan historically had cold relations following Bangladesh’s independence in 1971; thus the meeting signals a thawing and realignment of relationships.
An architecture under China’s leadership
- China acted as convener and broker of the meeting. This positions China as more than just a bilateral power in South Asia; it becomes a regional network architect.
- The meeting emphasises cooperation on trade, agriculture, connectivity and climate change – areas beyond narrow security concerns, signalling a broader agenda for China-led regional cooperation.
Potential shift in regional dynamics
- For Bangladesh this offers options beyond India: for example, in March 2025 Bangladesh’s PM (or adviser) visited China, Dhaka signed cooperation deals, etc.
- For Pakistan, it extends its strategic orbit beyond China and perhaps beyond its historic India-centric rivalry.
- For India, this could represent a diplomatic challenge: a neighbour (Bangladesh) deepening ties with China and Pakistan in a format that excludes India. Some analysts call this “ring-fencing” of India.
Connectivity and trade prospects
- The meeting raises the possibility of new trade routes and maritime connectivity among Pakistan, Bangladesh and China. For example, Bangladesh gained access to Karachi/Chattogram shipping, easing transit and trade.
- It may pave the way for future infrastructure cooperation linking Pakistani ports and Bangladeshi transit/logistics—with Chinese investment and technology as catalysts.
Strategic signalling
- The statement from the meeting emphasised “good-neighbourly, equal and mutually trusted cooperation”. While China claims the initiative is “not directed at any third party”, the timing and participants send a clear signal to India and other regional powers.
- The fact that Bangladesh’s interim government was willing to participate signals a foreign-policy pivot (or at least a diversification) away from over-alignment with India.

Opportunities and Challenges

No diplomatic initiative is free of opportunity and risk. China’s growing diplomatic footprint—and the trilateral mechanism in particular—brings a mixture of potential benefits and significant challenges.

Opportunities

For Bangladesh and Pakistan: Access to Chinese finance, infrastructure, trade, and technology; diversification of partners; potential new transit and connectivity options; leveraging Chinese leadership to raise their regional standing.
For South Asia more broadly: If the trilateral formula expands into a genuinely inclusive cooperation platform, it could jump-start trade, infrastructure, climate cooperation and connectivity. For example, intra-regional trade in South Asia remains low; new corridors could improve economics.
For China: The ability to embed itself more deeply in a key region, secure strategic routes and partnerships, and present itself as a constructive regional power.
For regional integration: Traditional institutional stagnation (e.g., SAARC) means new formats may be favourable—even if China-laser-led—to break logjams and deliver infrastructure and trade.

Challenges and Risks

Debt and dependency: The infrastructure financing model is fraught with risk. Some projects are economically weak, leaving recipient states vulnerable to debt burdens and Chinese leverage. As one study warns, many BRI projects are “economically unviable”. Bangladesh, for one, has borrowed heavily from China, raising concerns of debt sustainability.
Geopolitical backlash: Stronger Chinese influence may provoke push-back not only from India but from the United States, Japan, Australia and other states invested in regional balance. Bangladesh and Pakistan must navigate carefully so as not to alienate other partners.
Loss of strategic autonomy: For Bangladesh especially, aligning too closely with China (and implicitly with the China–Pakistan-axis) could reduce its ability to act independently vis-à-vis India, the U.S., or other powers.
Regional fragmentation: A China-led minilateral network that excludes major players (e.g., India) may deepen divisions, weaken inclusive regional architecture, and create blocs rather than open cooperation. Some analysts argue excluding India is a strategic mistake.
Implementation gap: Symbolic diplomatic meetings are easier than translating them into concrete projects. The trilateral mechanism is nascent, and its real functional impact remains to be tested.
Security risk spill-over: Enhanced defence cooperation with China may inflame regional tensions. For example, India may step up reciprocal alliances, leading to militarised interplay.
Domestic political risks: In Bangladesh, internal political change (e.g., elections in 2026) could reverse or moderate government orientation. As one study notes:

“This is not merely diplomacy; it is part of an effort to redraw Bangladesh’s regional alliances – a move that may lead to a broader geopolitical shift … but the long-term future for Yunus’s strategy will be tested over the coming year – by the reaction of New Delhi, and by elections now scheduled for April 2026.”

What This Means for Pakistan, Bangladesh and India

Pakistan

For Pakistan, the China-Pakistan tie remains the cornerstone of its foreign policy in South Asia. The trilateral meeting provides Pakistan additional diplomatic space to engage with Bangladesh (and by extension, China’s connectivity network). Pakistan may gain transit and economic access to Bangladeshi ports and markets, reducing its over-reliance on India or China-Pakistan bilateral corridors alone. However, Pakistan must guard against falling into deeper economic dependence on China, as the debt/dominance risks loom.

Bangladesh

For Bangladesh, the relationship with China presents both opportunity and risk. Bangladesh is clearly hedging: engaging China heavily, but also keeping relations with India and other states in view. The trilateral meeting suggests Bangladesh is comfortable diversifying, possibly pivoting away from India-centric regionalism. If it manages Chinese investments well and safeguards its autonomy, Bangladesh could gain infrastructure, connectivity, and diplomatic space. But mis-handling could lead to political push-back (domestic/popular) or strategic vulnerability.

India

For India, the unfolding China-Pakistan-Bangladesh trilateral is a potential strategic challenge. India has long viewed South Asia (and especially its “neighbours”) as its natural domain. The rise of a Chinese-led diplomatic architecture that draws in India’s neighbours may diminish New Delhi’s leverage. To counter this, India may intensify its “Neighbourhood First” policy, deepen its partnerships with the U.S., Japan, Australia and bolster regional institutions like BIMSTEC. It may also emphasise connectivity and transit cooperation (e.g., via India-Bangladesh, India-Nepal) to undercut Chinese corridors. The key will be how effectively India adapts to the changing dynamics.

Future Scenarios and Strategic Options

Looking ahead, several possible trajectories emerge for China’s diplomatic footprint in South Asia and the trilateral mechanism.

Scenario 1: Consolidation and expansion

In this scenario, the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh trilateral is institutionalised: a working group is activated, tangible projects are launched (e.g., new port-rail linkages, joint ventures, trade corridors). Additional countries (e.g., Sri Lanka, Nepal, Maldives) are gradually included, either formally or informally. This leads to a China-led “South Asia Plus” connectivity-and-cooperation bloc, which competes with or complements existing frameworks.

For Pakistan and Bangladesh, this means real gains: new trade routes, infrastructure, Chinese investment, deeper defence/political ties. For China, it secures long-term strategic depth in South Asia. For India, this could compel a major shift in its diplomatic strategy.

Scenario 2: Partial follow-through

Here the trilateral remains largely symbolic. Few concrete projects emerge, or they face delays, cost-overruns or political push-back (domestic opposition, Indian resistance). Bangladesh (given upcoming elections) re-balances toward India. Pakistan’s economic problems limit its ability to absorb Chinese projects. China shifts attention elsewhere. The new architecture stalls or fragments.

In this case, China still gains ground—its role as convener and investor persists—but the full strategic ambition is curtailed. Pakistan and Bangladesh secure some infrastructure gains, but miss out on major connectivity breakthroughs. India retains much of its influence.

Scenario 3: Backlash and re-adjustment

Twin pressures—Indian push-back and domestic political backlash in Bangladesh or Pakistan—lead to a recalibration. Bangladesh might slow or reverse its tilt toward China; Pakistan might face domestic push-back over Chinese debt/investment; India may build counter-alliances (Quad, Indo-Pacific strategy) and increase its regional economic connectivity (e.g., Mekong–Ganga, BIMSTEC). China’s South Asia strategy remains important but is scaled back or diversified toward South-East Asia, Africa, Central Asia.

In this scenario, the trilateral format survives but becomes one of multiple tracks, less dominant than initially projected.

Strategic options for key players

For China:

Proceed with the trilateral format, turning it into a functional mechanism with deliverables (connectivity projects, trade facilitation, defence exercises).
Balance its power projection so as to avoid alienating India unnecessarily (to avoid regional escalation).
Mitigate debt/dependency criticism by increasing transparency, offering favourable financing terms, engaging in local capacity-building.

For Bangladesh:

Leverage Chinese investment while retaining strategic balance: keep India, the U.S., Japan, ADB/World Bank in view.
Conduct cost-benefit analysis of Chinese infrastructure loans; ensure that they serve domestic development rather than impose unsustainable burdens.
Capitalise on trilateral network by negotiating terms that favour Bangladesh (e.g., access to Pakistani ports, transit corridors) and developing its own industrial base in the process.

For Pakistan:

Use the trilateral platform to diversify trade routes (via Bangladesh and China) and reduce economic dependency on one route or corridor.
Ensure Chinese investment and connectivity projects are integrated into Pakistan’s domestic economy (job creation, localisation) rather than simply foreign-led enclaves.
Manage the debt-sustainability issue and ensure that strategic alignment with China does not undermine ties with other states.

For India:

Strengthen bilateral ties with Bangladesh (and other neighbours) via infrastructure, trade concessions, connectivity projects, people-to-people links, and cultural-historical ties.
Accelerate its own regional engagement frameworks: BIMSTEC, Indo-Pacific partnerships, Bay of Bengal cooperation.
Offer alternative connectivity and economic options to neighbours so that the Chinese-led options do not become de facto monopolies.
Maintain diplomatic flexibility: push for inclusion of new regional architectures but aim to shape them rather than be sidelined.

Critical Perspectives and Caveats

While much of the analysis focuses on China’s ambitions and the opportunities they present, it is crucial to note some cautionary perspectives and caveats:

Over-reach risk: China may be ambitious but regional geography, politics, inertia and local resistance may limit what can practically be achieved. South Asia has structural impediments: weak institutions, political instability, infrastructural bottlenecks, legacy border disputes (e.g., India–Pakistan, India–Bangladesh).
Economic viability questions: Some Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in South Asia have struggled with delayed returns, cost escalation or under-utilisation. As the Hudson Institute notes, “more than a third of BRI projects are economically unviable”. The recipient states’ ability to service debts is a real concern.
Domestic politics: In Bangladesh, upcoming elections (2026) may lead to a different government and foreign-policy orientation. Public sentiment (nationalism, transparency concerns) may push back on large-scale Chinese engagement.
India’s potential counter-moves: India is not passive. Its strategic depth, economic growth, and alliances may enable it to counterbalance China’s moves. The Asian dynamics are not simply Chinese dominance but contested space.
Security risks: The blending of economic/infrastructure projects with military/strategic aims may alarm smaller states’ publics and lead to resistance or alliance instability.
Ambiguity of motivations: While China frames its diplomacy as cooperative and non-directed at any third party, the strategic implications (especially from an Indian perspective) are clear. The rhetoric may not always align with perceptions or outcomes. For example, the trilateral statement emphasised “equal and mutually trusted cooperation … not directed at any third party”.
Regional fragmentation vs integration: While minilaterals (China-Pakistan-Bangladesh) may achieve speed and focus, they also risk creating exclusionary blocs and undermining inclusive regionalism (which many believe preferable). Some analysts warn against leaving India out of new architectures.

Conclusion

China’s growing diplomatic footprint in South Asia represents a significant evolution in regional geopolitics. From bilateral infrastructure deals and arms sales, China is moving toward a more ambitious diplomatic and institutional presence – of which the June 2025 trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Bangladesh is an emblematic case. For China, this enhances influence, connectivity and strategic leverage. For Pakistan and Bangladesh, it offers new opportunities and diversification, albeit with important caveats around dependency and autonomy. For India and the region more broadly, the developments signal a shift in balance and an imperative to respond strategically.

The trilateral –– modest in formal deliverables so far but rich in symbolism –– could herald a new phase of China-led minilateral diplomacy in South Asia. If properly pursued, it may give rise to a functional regional architecture anchored by connectivity, trade and cooperation; if mishandled, it may deepen divisions, provoke backlash, or result in unfulfilled promises.

For Pakistan and Bangladesh, the key will be to ensure that the diplomatic and economic engagements are aligned with their development goals, that sovereignty and autonomy are preserved, and that they do not become mere satellites of Chinese strategic vision. For China, the challenge is to translate diplomatic ambition into sustainable cooperation that delivers results for partner states—without triggering debilitating debt burdens or geo-strategic pushback.

For South Asia as a whole, the growing Chinese diplomatic footprint brings both potential and peril: potential in the form of new connectivity, trade and prosperity; peril in the form of new fault-lines, strategic competition and regional fragmentation. Whether the region, including India, can adapt and shape these changes so that cooperation trumps rivalry remains a crucial question for the coming decade.

In sum, China’s role in South Asia is no longer passive or peripheral: it is increasingly central and proactive. The region is entering a phase of diplomatic realignment, and how the actors – China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and others – navigate this will shape South Asia’s trajectory in this century.

CSS/UPSC & Other competitive examinations preparation

current affairs for competitive examinations 2026, (China’s growing diplomatic footprint in South Asia: e.g., hosting the first-ever trilateral meeting with Pakistan and Bangladesh).